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Abstract 
In this paper, we present evidence on empirical connections between crime and education, using 
various data sources from Britain. A robust finding is that criminal activity is negatively associated 
with higher levels of education. However, it is essential to ensure that the direction of causation flows 
from education to crime. Therefore, we identify the effect of education on participation in criminal 
activity using changes in compulsory school leaving age laws over time to account for the 
endogeneity of education. In this causal approach, for property crimes, the negative crime-education 
relationship remains strong and significant. The implications of these findings are unambiguous and 
clear. They show that improving education can yield significant social benefits and can be a key 
policy tool in the drive to reduce crime. 
 
Keywords: Crime; education; offenders 
JEL Classifications: I2; K42 
 
 
 
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Education and Skills Programme.  The Centre for 
Economic Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council. 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
The authors wish to thank the Economic and Social Research Council for funding under research 
grant RES-000-22-0568. We are especially thankful to Jonathan Wadsworth for his help with the 
Labour Force Survey database. Participants at the annual conference of the European Society of 
Criminology in Tübingen, Ph.D. conference on research in economics in Volterra, IZA summer 
school in labour economics in Buch am Ammersee, Economics of Education summer school in Steyr 
and seminar participants at the CPB in the Hague, and the Tinbergen Institute in Amsterdam provided 
very helpful discussion. Special thanks goes to Pierre Koning, Aico van Vuuren, Dinand Webbink, 
Paul Bingley, Panu Pelkonen, and Olmo Silva for providing helpful comments. 
 Stephen Machin is Research Director of the Centre for Economic Performance and Director 
of the Centre for the Economics of Education, London School of Economics. He is also Professor of 
Economics at University College London. Olivier Marie is a Research Economist at the Centre for 
Economic Performance and Post-Doctoral researcher at the Research Centre for Education and the 
Labour Market (ROA), University of Maastricht. Sunčica Vujić is a Research Officer in the 
Department of Management, London School of Economics 
 
 
 
 
Published by 
Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
 
All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or 
transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of the publisher nor 
be issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it is published. 
 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent to the 
editor at the above address. 
 
© S. Machin, O. Marie and S. Vujić, submitted 2010 
 1
1. Introduction 
 
Crime reduction is high on the public policy agenda, not least because of the large economic 
and social benefits it brings. Indeed, research on the determinants of crime points in several 
directions as to how crime reduction can be facilitated. For example, a relatively large body 
of research undertaken by social scientists considers the potential for expenditures on crime 
fighting resources (like increased police presence, or new crime fighting technologies), or on 
particular policies, to combat crime. Other work focuses more on the characteristics of 
criminals and considers what characteristics are more connected to higher criminal 
participation. In this latter case, policies that affect these characteristics can, if implemented 
successfully, be used to counter crime. 
In this paper, we focus on one such characteristic that has received some attention in 
the quantitative literature on the determinants of crime, namely education. In this literature, 
there are a number of studies that relate crime participation to the education of individuals, 
typically reporting that less educated individuals are more likely to engage in crime.1 A 
drawback associated with almost all of this work is that it is difficult to guarantee that the 
direction of causation flows from education to crime (and not the other way round). This, of 
course, matters if one wishes to consider appropriate policy responses to empirical findings. 
In this paper, we try to carefully isolate the causal empirical connection between 
crime and education in the UK context. We do so using several different modelling 
approaches, based on different measures of crime and education from several different data 
sources. Our results show sizeable effects of education on crime that appear robust to 
methodological approaches and data sources. The implications of these findings are clear, 
                                                 
1 Examples from the criminology literature include Farrington (1986, 2001) and from the education literature 
include Sabates (2008, 2009) and Sabates and Feinstein (2008).  There is much less work by economists.  
Lochner and Moretti (2004) is a highly notable exception. 
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showing that improving educational attainment of the marginal individuals can act as a key 
policy tool in the drive to reduce crime. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives some theoretical 
background on the relationship between education and crime. Section 3 describes available 
crime data sources in Britain, their quality and, where relevant, how they can be matched to 
data on education. Section 4 discusses the empirical strategies that we are able to implement 
and the results, together with a calculation of the social benefits that follow from the crime 
reducing effect of education. Concluding remarks are given in the last section of the paper.  
 
 
2. How Education Can Impact on Crime 
 
There are number of theoretical reasons why education may have an effect on crime. From 
the existing socio-economic literature there are (at least) three main channels through which 
schooling might affect criminal participation: income effects, time availability, and patience 
or risk aversion. For most crimes, one would expect that these factors induce a negative effect 
of schooling on crime. In what follows, we discuss each of these channels in more detail.  
For the case of income effects, education increases the returns to legitimate work, 
raising the opportunity costs of illegal behaviour. Consequently, subsidies that encourage 
investments in human capital reduce crime indirectly by raising future wage rates (Lochner, 
2004). Additionally, punishment for criminal behaviour may entail imprisonment. By raising 
wage rates, schooling makes any time spent out of the labour market more costly (Lochner 
and Moretti, 2004; Hjalmarsson, 2008). Therefore, those who can earn more are less likely to 
engage in crime. 
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The idea that education raises skill levels and wage rates, which then lowers crime, is 
not a new one. Ehrlich (1975) empirically examined a number of predictions from an 
intuitive model relating education to crime. Grogger (1998) investigated the relationship 
between wage rates and criminal participation. The author shows that graduating from high 
school reduces criminal productivity and that criminals have on average less education than 
non-criminals. Linking crime to wages, Grogger (1998) concludes that youth offending 
behaviour is responsive to price incentives and that falling real wages may have been an 
important factor in rising youth crime during the 1970s and 1980s. Machin and Meghir 
(2004) look at cross-area changes in crime and the low wage labour market in England and 
Wales. They find that crime fell in areas where wage growth in the bottom 25th percentile of 
the distribution was faster and conclude that “improvements in human capital accumulation 
through the education system or other means… enhancing individual labour market 
productivity… would be important ingredients in reducing crime.” 
However, there is also some evidence that education can also increase the earnings 
from crime and the tools learnt in school may be inappropriately used for criminal activities. 
In this sense, education may have a positive effect on crime. Levitt and Lochner (2001) find 
that males with higher scores on mechanical information tests had increased offence rates. 
Lochner (2004) also estimates that across cohorts, increases in average education are 
associated with 11% increase in white collar arrest rates (although this estimated effect is not 
statistically significant). 
Time spent in education may also be important for teenagers in terms of limiting the 
time available for participating in criminal activity. This can be thought of as “the cynical 
explanation is that whilst youngsters are at school they are being kept off the streets,” 
(Hansen, 2003). This ‘self-incapacitation’ effect was documented by Tauchen et al. (1994) 
who found that time spent at school (and work) during a year is negatively correlated to the 
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probability of arrest that year. Hjalmarsson (2008) looked at the opposite relationship of the 
impact of being arrested and incarcerated before finishing school on probability to graduate. 
Her results suggest that the more times you are caught committing crime and the amount of 
time spent in prison both greatly increases the likelihood of becoming a high school dropout.   
As these still may be endogenous decisions, Jacobs and Lefgren (2003) instrument 
days off school with exogenous teacher training days. They find that property crime increases 
significantly in areas where youths have days off school validating the idea of the self-
incapacitation effect of education on criminal participation. However, they also report that 
violent offences arrests increase while school is in session and attribute this to a concentration 
effect.2 This, as Jacobs and Lefgren (2003) point out, only measures potential short-term 
impacts of education on crime. However, we can easily argue that criminal participation as a 
youth has longer run effects on future offending behaviour. Moreover, it is important when 
considering the immediate impact of policies that incentivise youths to stay on at school.  
Education may also influence crime through its effect on patience and risk aversion 
(Lochner and Moretti, 2004). Here, future returns from any activity are discounted according 
to one’s patience in waiting for them. Thus, individuals with a lot of patience have low 
discount rates and value future earnings more highly as compared to those with high discount 
rates. Oreopoulos (2007) summarizes a sample of studies from the from psychological and 
neurological literatures, concluding that young people who drop out of school tend to be 
myopic and more focussed on immediate costs from schooling (stress from taking tests, 
uninteresting curricula, foregone earnings, etc.), rather than on future gains from an 
additional year of schooling. This line of literature also suggests that adolescents lack abstract 
reasoning skills and are predisposed to risky behaviour. Education can increase patience, 
which reduces the discount rate of future earnings and hence reduces the propensity to 
                                                 
2 This is the geographical proximity of a large number of youths – in the educational establishment – which may 
result in increasing the probability of violent encounters. 
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commit crimes. Education may also increase risk aversion that, in turn, increases the weight 
given by individuals to a possible punishment and consequently reduces the likelihood of 
committing crimes.  
In summary, if education increases the marginal returns of earnings from legal more 
than illegal activities, schooling reduces the time available to commit crimes and positively 
affects patience levels. We therefore expect crime to be decreasing in the number of years of 
schooling and higher qualification attainment. It is also very likely that, everything else equal, 
individuals with higher wage rates, those who spend more time in school, and those with 
lower discount factors, will commit less crime. 
 
 
3. Data 
 
In analysing crime and education, a number of data related issues arise.  First, there is the 
issue of crime measurement that is different across data sources. Second, whilst some micro-
data on crime does contain information on the characteristics of criminals, the majority does 
not.  In the latter case, we need some means of matching crime data to education data.  We 
consider each of these in turn. 
 
Crime Data 
Probably the most commonly used source of crime data in quantitative research is 
information on criminal offences recorded by the police. As not all of these offences are 
solved, this type of data does not contain information on characteristics of the individuals 
committing these recorded offences. Unless these data are aggregated to some geographical 
level (like Police Force Areas) and matched to education data at this level, then it is not 
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possible to use these data to study the empirical relationship between crime and education. 
Being realistic, only spatial aggregation is feasible as the offence data cannot be broken down 
by individual demographic characteristics. This does not offer much hope to credibly study 
the research question of interest in this paper. 
The other main form of crime data available from the criminal justice system is on 
individuals who enter the criminal justice system after having been apprehended or charged 
for a crime. The Offenders Index Database (OID) contains information of the characteristics 
of individual offenders, holding criminal history data for offenders convicted of standard list 
offences from 1963 onwards.3 The data is derived from the Court Appearances system and is 
updated quarterly. The Index was created purely for research and statistical analysis. Its main 
purpose is to provide full criminal history data on a randomly selected sample of offenders.  
The OID dataset we have access to holds anonymous samples for offenders sentenced 
during four weeks each year from the 1960s onwards.4 We also have the entire pre and post 
court appearance history of these individuals after this period. However, there is no 
information on a defendant’s education level in the OID and the data needs to be aggregated 
in some way to connect to education data. A big advantage (certainly relative to the recorded 
offences data) is that some demographic characteristics are available in the OID, notably age 
and gender, and so these data are more suited to a study of crime and education to be 
undertaken at a level aggregated to the demographic breakdown of crimes that is available. 
Micro data that simultaneously contains information on an individual’s education 
level and criminal activity is only occasionally available. In the UK context there are, 
however, two large scale datasets with such information available that we can consider: 
                                                 
3 Standard list offences are all indictable or triable offences plus a few of the more serious summary offences. 
Standard list class codes are set out in the Offenders Index codebook (see Offenders Index “Codebook” and 
Offenders Index “A User’s Guide,” Research Development and Statistics Directorate, Home Office.) 
4 Offenders were chosen where they appeared in court during the first week in March, the second week in June, 
the third week in September and the third week in November. The first week in any calendar month is the week 
where the Monday is the first Monday in that month. 
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i) Census data containing information on incarceration and on individual education 
levels. The Samples of Anonymised Records (SARs) are samples of individual records from 
the 1991 and 2001 UK Censuses. They are micro-data files with a separate record for each 
individual, covering large sample sizes (between 1-5 percent of the population). The key 
advantage of the Census data is that we are able to identify individuals who are in prison 
service establishments (see the Communal Establishment Breakdown in Table A1 in 
Appendix A). However, only the 2001 Census has good enough data on individual education 
and so we are constrained to looking at links between imprisonment and education in the 
2001 cross-section only.5  
ii) British Crime Survey (BCS) data which asks a large sample of the British 
population about, among other things, their contacts with the criminal justice system and also 
contains information on the respondent’s education level and rudimentary self report 
information on criminal histories. We report results using the 2001/2 through 2007/8 surveys, 
the period since the survey went annual.6  Using this alternative data source is an important 
complementary part of our study since it should be relatively free of any biases in arrest, 
prosecution, and imprisonment probability due to levels of education (which may be a worry 
when using non self-reported crime information). 
 
Amalgamating Data on Crime and Education 
To carry out the cohort analysis, we aggregated the number of OID court appearances by age 
and gender from 1984 to 2002.7 We calculated offending rates (per 1000 population) using 
                                                 
5 Specifically we use the Controlled Access Microdata Samples (CAMS) in the 2001 Census. 
6 The British Crime Survey was first carried out in 1982, collecting information about people’s experiences of 
crime in 1981. The BCS was then carried out in 1984, 1988, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2001. Since 
2001/02, the survey has run continuously on an annual basis, containing consistent questions and sampling 
methods, and now covers around 45000 households each year in England and Wales. 
7 Although the OID is available from 1963 onwards, consistent age-cohort level data on education from the LFS 
database is only available from 1984 onwards. See further data description in this section.  
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the ONS population data by age-gender cohort and year.8 For the estimation results, criminal 
offences have been broadly categorised as property crimes (burglary, theft and handling 
stolen goods, and criminal damage) and violent crimes (violence against the person, sexual 
offences, and robbery).  
To this cohort panel, we matched Labour Force Survey (LFS) data on education, and 
data on wages from the New Earnings Survey.9 Several explanatory variables were extracted 
from the LFS data for the period 1984 to 2002. In particular, we focused on age gender, date 
of birth (in order to construct school leaving age dummies), age when completed continuous 
full-time education, and highest level of qualification obtained. Other characteristics 
extracted are ethnicity, whether employed or unemployed, and whether living in London or 
not. These variables were first aggregated into cell means by age cohort and year and then 
matched with the OID in order to form a quasi-panel for age cohorts from 16 to 59 in the 
period 1984 to 2002. This was done overall and then separately for men and women, and for 
property and violent crimes. We also carried out the same matching exercise with data on 
wages from the New Earnings Survey. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
There are two main empirical approaches we adopt, the first using micro-data from the 2001 
Census cross-section and BCS data, and the second looking at age cohorts from OID data 
matched to the LFS and NES data sources. We begin by considering basic empirical 
                                                 
8 The population data were kindly made available by the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS). 
9 The LFS is a large-scale household survey which was carried out in 1975, 1977, 1979, 1981 and then annually 
from 1983 through 1992, after which it became a quarterly survey. The NES is a 1% employer reported annual 
survey on individual wages, on which we have access to micro-data from 1975 onwards. 
 9
correlations from both, and then turn to the causal estimates that can be obtained from the 
cohort data. 
 
Estimates of Crime-Education Associations 
a) Census Data on Imprisonment 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for 2001 Census imprisonment rates, for all individuals 
and broken down by gender and age. The first column of the Table shows that, overall, 0.13 
percent of 16-64 year olds in the British population were in prison on the Census date in 
April 2001. Imprisonment rates for young men aged 16 to 20 are higher than average at 0.34 
percent, and are highest, at 0.57 percent, among the age 21 to 25 males. The imprisonment 
rates then declines for older age men.10 Far fewer women are in prison and even amongst the 
highest sub-group (again aged 21-25) imprisonment rates remain low. 
Columns (2), (3) and (4) show there to be stark differences by education level. The 
percent in prison is massively higher amongst those with no educational qualifications. For 
example, 2.57 percent of men aged 21-25 with no educational qualifications were in prison in 
2001. This compares to 0.30 percent of the same age-gender group with at least some 
qualifications. 
Column (4) shows imprisonment gaps between the no qualification and some 
qualification groups. The gaps are reported in two ways, as percentage gaps and as relative 
risk ratios (RRR). It is evident that there are large gaps in imprisonment rates that are related 
to the possession of educational qualifications. Moreover, the gaps are at their largest for the 
age groups where more people are in prison: see the largest relative risk ratios in the final 
column for the age 21-25 group, for both men (8.57) and women (8.50). 
                                                 
10 This is in line with the postulations of the well documented “crime-age curve" which peaks in the late teens 
and early twenties (Gottfredson and Hirshi, 1986). 
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Table 2 presents logit estimates that condition upon an additional range of individual 
characteristics from the Census (listed in the notes to the Table). The results are reported for 
the whole sample, men and women separately, and for the different age groups by gender. 
The logit regression model is based on the log odds ratio (log[p/(1-p)]) where p is a 0/1 
variable indicating whether a person is in prison or not), which represents the probability of a 
success compared with the probability of failure. Hence, an interpretation of estimated 
coefficients in the logit regression which is usually more intuitive is the ‘odds ratio’ or the 
relative risk ratio (RRR), reported in the third column of the Table. The marginal effects, 
reported in the second column show the change in the probability of imprisonment due to a 
unit change of an education variable in question.  
The results in Table 2 very much confirm the descriptive analysis. Even after 
conditioning on a range of factors, there is a sizeable gap in imprisonment rates between 
those with no qualifications and those with some educational qualifications. For the full 
sample, the RRR of around 4 shows that people with no qualifications are four times more 
likely to be in prison than those with some qualifications. For young men these odds rise even 
more, to around 9.1 for 16-20 year olds, and to 14.8 for women in the same age group.11  
b) Self-Report Data on Criminal Histories 
This section considers crime-education associations from self-report data in the British Crime 
Surveys. Table 3 shows descriptive statistics on two self-report measures on whether 
individuals have ever been arrested (in Panel A) or whether they have ever been in court as 
the person accused of committing a crime (Panel B). Column (1) shows summary statistics 
                                                 
11 The Census education variable is more detailed than the no/some educational qualifications split we consider. 
There is information on five qualification levels, ranging from Level 0 (No Qualifications) through to Level 4 
(Degree or higher). We look at the no/some distinction so we can include the young people in our sample since 
some may not have completed their education, and these are an important group to consider in studies of 
criminal activity. Specifications estimated for older samples that enter in four dummy variables for No 
Qualifications, Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3 (omitting Level 4 as the reference category) show a monotonic 
relationship between the probability of imprisonment and qualification attainment. For example, for men aged 
26-30 the relative risk ratios were estimated as 13.46 (Level 0), 6.32 (Level 1), 5.56 (Level 2), 2.27 (Level 3). 
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for all sample respondents, then broken down by age and gender.  Columns (2), and (3) 
consider breakdowns by level of education, and column (4) the gaps between them. 
The upper panel of the Table shows that 12.9 percent of people report ever being 
arrested. Not surprisingly, this is a lot higher for men than for women (at 21.3 percent 
compared to 4.1 percent).  Considering breakdowns by whether or not BCS sample members 
have some or no educational qualifications, sizable gaps emerge.  Almost 17 percent of those 
with no educational qualifications report having ever been arrested, whilst the comparable 
number for people with some qualifications is 11.8 percent (column (4) shows the 4.9 
percentage point gap to be strongly significant).  
The breakdown across demographic (age by gender) groups is also interesting and 
follows a very similar pattern to the imprisonment rates from the Census data.  The biggest 
percentage point gap in being arrested is the 13.6 points difference we observe for men aged 
16-24.  Gaps are much lower amongst women of all ages. The bottom Panel of Table 3 shows 
similar patterns for the other self-report measure, whether an individual reports having been 
in court as the accused. Overall, 9 percent of the sample report this to be the case, with the 
percentage being significantly higher for those with no qualifications (at 11.9 percent), and 
being consistently higher for men. 
Table 4 reports estimates of coefficients (and associated marginal effects and relative 
risk ratios) on a no qualifications variable entered into logit regressions of the probability of 
being arrested or in court as the accused.  The strong patterns seen in the descriptive Table 
hold up.  Individuals with no educational qualifications have significantly higher models of 
self-reported crime incidence, with relative risks being higher for men, especially younger 
men. Overall, these results are very similar, in qualitative terms, to the Census imprisonment 
equations reported in Table 2. 
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c) Cross-Cohort Data on Offending Rates 
The third piece of observational evidence we consider comes from the cohort panel data we 
have assembled from OID and LFS/NES data.  A first set of results is reported in Table 5.  
Unlike with the Census or BCS analysis we are now able to consider different types of 
crimes. The upper panel of the Table thus reports results from models of property crimes, 
whilst the lower panel considers violent crimes.  These are useful distinctions to draw if we 
think education may have less of an impact on violent rather than property offending, given 
the potential importance of labour market opportunities in explaining the relationship 
between education and property crime. Because of the availability of more detailed education 
data in the LFS, we can also consider models where education is measured, as with the 
analysis to date, in terms of no educational qualifications, but also in terms of years of 
education. Results from both are considered in the Table. 
The results in Table 5 provide more evidence of a significant association between 
crime and education.  There are several results of interest.  First, the effects seem to be most 
important for property crimes, and there is little systematic relation with violent crime. This is 
in line with the use of the standard economic model of crime which predicts that the likely 
effects of education investments are more likely to be of relevance for property, rather than 
violent, crime. Second, the significant negative association between property crime and 
education is revealed in the Table for both measures of education considered. 
 
Causal Estimates from Cross-Cohort Data 
The results to date consistently show evidence from observational data of higher crime rates 
for less educated individuals. However, as we have already noted several times, results from 
the kinds of exercises considered so far may not reflect the causal impact of education on 
crime.   
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To see this for our cohort models, consider a simple least squares regression of a 
measure of offending for a particular age cohort i in year t ( itO ) with an  education variable 
( itE ) as an explanatory variable and jitX  ( Jj ,,, L21= ) being a set of other control 
variables: 
it
J
j
jitjitit uXEO +++= ∑
=0
10 δαα                                                  (1) 
where itu  is an error term in the equation. 
If unobserved characteristics of cohorts drive crime participation, but also education, 
then least squares estimates of 1α  (like those given in Table 5) will be biased. This is a key 
issue to the extent that unobserved characteristics affecting schooling decisions may be 
correlated with unobservables influencing the decision to engage in crime. For example, 1α  
could be estimated to be negative, even if schooling has no causal effect on crime. This 
would be the case if individuals who have high criminal returns were likely to spend most of 
their time committing crime rather than work, regardless of their educational background. As 
long as education does not increase the returns to crime, these individuals are likely to drop 
out of further education. As a result, we might observe a negative correlation between 
education and crime even though there is no causal effect between the two. Therefore, the 
challenge is to find an appropriate instrument for education.  
To credibly identify a causal impact of education on crime, we adopt a quasi-
experimental approach relying on variations in education induced by changes in compulsory 
school leaving age laws over time to validate the direction of causation. This is akin to 
Lochner and Moretti’s (2004) approach, which exploits changes in school leaving age laws 
across US states. We use here two raisings of the school leaving age that occurred in Britain 
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in 1947 and 1973 as instrumental variables in our empirical analysis.12 Details on the nature, 
and rationales, for the reform are given in Appendix B. 
It needs to be acknowledged that the variation induced by these two instruments is 
likely to only identify a local impact, as it is much more likely to have an impact at the 
bottom of the education distribution and very little impact at the top of the education 
distribution. This is because people near the top would have stayed on after the compulsory 
school leaving age anyway and the change would not affect them.13 Therefore, the effect that 
our empirical approach estimates is the local average treatment (LATE) effect among those 
who alter their treatment status because they react to the instrument. For this reason, we 
consider the effects separately for the continuous years of education measure, but also more 
appropriately for the no qualifications variable. We also show some results where those with 
no qualifications are compared only to those with slightly higher qualifications. 
Identification is achieved through inclusion in a first stage education regression of two 
dummy variables that record the exogenous change in the minimum school-leaving age 
(SLA) that occurred in England and Wales in two particular years. In particular, the two 
dummy variables are defined for individuals who entered their last compulsory school year 
between 1947 and 1972 and hence faced a minimum SLA of 15 (variable SLA1), and for 
those entering their last compulsory year from 1973 onwards who therefore faced a minimum 
SLA of 16 (variable SLA2). The minimum SLA of 14 is our omitted category. Hence we 
effectively use changes over time in the number of years of compulsory education that 
government imposed as an instrument for years of education. Since we have more than one 
                                                 
12 The education reform in Britain served as a source of exogenous variation in many papers in labour and health 
economics. Harmon and Walker (1995) and Oreopoulos (2006) focus on the causal impact of education and 
earnings. Galindo-Rueda (2003), Chevalier (2004), and Chevalier et al. (2005) look at the effect of parental 
income on education of their children. Oreopoulos (2006), Doyle et al. (2007), and Lindeboom et al. (2009) 
examine the impact of education on health. We are the first to consider this overall of the schooling system in 
England and Wales to study the causal impact of education on crime.  
13 Papers by Lindeboom et al. (2009) and Oreopoulos (2006) show that the first reform in Britain in 1947 only 
affected the schooling decisions of individuals at the lower end of the education distribution. 
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instrument, and only one variable to instrument, the model is over-identified, permitting us to 
implement a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach. 
The set of estimating equations now look as follows: 
∑
∑
=
=
++++=
+++=
J
j
itjitjititit
J
j
itjitjitit
XSLASLAE
XEO
0
210
0
10
21 νθδδδ
υϕββ
                                     (2) 
In this framework, it is important whether changes in compulsory schooling laws act as valid 
instruments. A legitimate instrument for education in equation (1) is a variable that: (i) 
significantly explains part of the variation in education; and (ii) is not correlated with the 
unobservables that are correlated with both offending and education. Put alternatively, it is a 
variable that is a determinant of schooling that can legitimately be omitted from equation (1).  
To answer the first criteria, let us go back to the definition of our instruments. We use 
changes over time in the number of years of compulsory education that government imposed 
as an instrument for years of education. Harmon and Walker (1995) use the same instruments 
to identify the causal impact of education on wages. They show that the 1947 change was 
particularly influential in raising participation in post-compulsory education. That is, many of 
those who would otherwise have left at the old minimum stayed on beyond the new minimum 
age. Oreopoulos (2006) even argues that his IV estimate of the returns to schooling using 
only the 1947 change as instrument for education is probably closer to the average treatment 
effect (ATE) estimator than the LATE, since the 1947 legislation affected almost half of the 
population. The strength of these compulsory school leaving age changes is very much 
confirmed in the first stage regressions we report below where there is a strong and highly 
significant correlation between the two policy changes and education.  
Considering the second criteria for a valid instrument, we believe our instruments 
form a plausible identification strategy since changes in compulsory attendance laws have not 
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historically been concerned by problems with crime. To our knowledge, legislators enacting 
the laws did not act in response to concerns with juvenile delinquency, youth unemployment, 
or other factors related to crime, thus making schooling laws an appropriate instrument.  
The two-stage least squares (2SLS) results are reported in Table 6.  We present results 
considering the causal impact of education on property crime.14 The Table has three panels, 
with results for all cohorts in the upper panel, for men only in the middle panel, and for men 
ages 21 to 40 in the lower panel. Two sets of specifications are reported in each panel, one for 
the years of education variable, and one for the no educational qualifications measure 
comparing to some qualification. In each case the first column (column (1) for years of 
education and columns (4) for no educational qualification) reproduces the least squares 
results from Table 5, the second column (columns (2), and (5)) show the education first 
stages and the third columns ((3), and (6) respectively) give the 2SLS estimates.15 
The first stage regressions are strongly significant, showing there to be no weak 
instrument problems, and the second stages are precisely determined. In all but one of the six 
specifications reported, the 2SLS estimate is (in absolute terms) larger in magnitude than the 
OLS estimate. The exception is for the no qualifications specification for the combined male 
and female cohorts, and even here one cannot reject the hypothesis that the significant 2SLS 
estimate is statistically different from the OLS estimate. This is suggestive that the least 
squares estimates are likely to be lower bounds and therefore that the causal impact of 
education is at least as sizable.  Interestingly, this is the same pattern as the only other paper 
that we know identifies a causal impact of education on crime with a credible identification 
strategy, namely the US paper by Lochner and Moretti (2004).  Overall, the pattern that 
emerges is of a significant causal crime reducing effect of education.  
                                                 
14 The IV strategy was clearly much less effective for the violent crime models and effects were imprecisely 
estimated. More detailed results are available on request from the authors. 
15 Notice that, strictly speaking, the lower panel is a just identified IV model as, due to the age restriction, only 
the SLA2 instrument can be considered. 
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In view of the issues raised in our discussion about local average treatment effects, it 
is interesting to consider results for sub-samples of the population that may have been 
proportionally more affected by the SLA changes. We do this in two ways in Table 7 where: 
i) We limit the sample closer to the discontinuity that generated the abrupt education changes 
by looking at cohorts born 4 years before or after the second SLA change (in columns (1) to 
(6) for years of education and no qualification compared to some qualification).  
ii) We report estimates (columns (7) to (9)) for individuals with no qualification compared to 
their peers who obtained a minimum qualification level (what we refer to as low 
qualifications in the Table).16  
The structure of the three panels in Table 7 is the same as in the previous Table. For 
the around the discontinuity sample, in columns (1) through (6), the magnitudes of the causal 
estimates rise and are large for the sample of individuals born around the 1973 SLA change 
threshold. The no qualifications versus low qualifications comparison in columns (7) to (9) 
produces more muted effects, with strongly significant first stages and in all but one of the 
reported specification the 2SLS/IV estimates are larger in absolute terms than the OLS ones. 
A causal crime reducing effect of education is strong and significant in these 2SLS/IV 
estimates. Still, the causal estimates remain large and significant with, for example, for the 
whole sample in the top panel, the estimated 2SLS coefficient suggests that lowering the no 
qualifications variable by 1 percent would reduce property crime by almost 1.1 percent.  We 
interpret this as a lower bound of the LATE estimates of the causal impact of education on 
crime. 
                                                 
16 Using LFS variable coding we define obtaining low qualifications as any other professional/vocational 
qualification and O levels or equivalent. 
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Discussion 
The analysis of the previous section identifies a robust, causal impact of education on 
property crime. Results on violent crime are more volatile and no clear pattern emerged, most 
likely because of the much noisier feature of the data. However, the vast majority of crimes 
that occur are property crimes (these represent more than 70 percent of offences recorded by 
the police and indictable offences tried in courts). Given that we have identified a sizable 
crime reducing impact of education, it thus seems interesting to try to say something about 
the economic importance of such an effect. We have therefore carried out a simple, and in our 
view informative, calculation of the possible social savings that could result from such crime 
reduction. 
Table 8 shows an estimate of the social benefits from crime reduction that would 
follow from a 1 percent reduction in the percentage of individuals with no educational 
qualifications. Using cost of crime estimates from Dubourg et al (2005) we calculate that the 
average cost of a property offence tried in court17 comes to £1,235.5. There were 16,319 
property offences convictions in 2002. We consider 2SLS/IV estimates from Table 6 and 7 of 
a 1 percent reduction in the population with no educational qualification on crime compared 
to two reference groups: individuals with some qualification (2.117) and individuals with low 
qualifications (1.051).  This represents between respectively 345 and 118 fewer property 
crime cases being brought to court. Since only 0.4 percent of property crimes recorded end up 
with a court conviction, this translates into an estimated net crime reduction of between 
88,469 and 43,921 offences. The corresponding figure in terms of social benefits from 
prevented crimes ranges from £109 to £54 million.  
This is a substantial amount, even for the lower bound estimate comparing no versus 
low qualifications, especially if one considers that the average cost to the government of a 
                                                 
17 In the OID, 16 percent of property offences are ‘burglaries’, 77 percent ‘theft and handling of stolen goods’, 
and 7 percent ‘criminal damage’.  
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year of education for a secondary school student is approximately £4,000 (Goodman and 
Sibieta, 2006). Making the assumption that an extra year of schooling at age 16 is equivalent 
to obtaining an educational qualification18, we estimate that this would cost a little under £22 
million to achieve a one percent change in this population. This leaves us with a net social 
benefit in terms of crime reduction of between £87 and 32 million.19  
Of course, this cost-benefit calculation should be carefully interpreted, exercising 
some degree of caution. For example, general equilibrium effects are not factored in, and we 
cannot measure the exact cost of obtaining an educational qualification. However, these seem 
unlikely to significantly offset the large social benefit estimates we obtain from our 
analysis.20 We believe these social savings to be large, reaffirming the importance of 
considering crime reduction as an extra indirect benefit of education policies (as highlighted 
by Lochner's, 2010, review).  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper presents new evidence on the effect of education on crime, looking at different 
data sources from Britain, and paying attention to the causal direction and magnitude of 
connections between the two. We uncover evidence that crime is significantly related to 
                                                 
18 We believe this to be a reasonable assumption, especially when considering the low qualification reference 
group. 
19 Our net social benefit estimate is much smaller than the $1.4 billion put forward by Lochner and Moretti 
(2004). The main reason is that we do not identify a clear impact of education on violent crime and especially 
murder which account for 80 percent of crime savings. When only considering prevented property crimes, then 
their estimate is just above $52 million or ₤35 million (at the average 1.5 ₤/$ exchange rate from 2002) which 
falls very close to our lower bound estimate of the social savings of crime.   
20 One way of thinking about general equilibrium effects would be to consider that the increase in the proportion 
of individuals with some qualification could reduce the wages of workers already with this education level. 
Considering the wage effects on crime with an elasticity of -1 as reported in Machin and Meghir (2004), it could 
be possible that it would increase the crime participation of the latter group. However we believe that this 
should be more than compensated by the decrease in crimes from the wage premium (estimated at around 40%) 
experienced by the individuals now obtaining some qualification.   
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education, especially in the case of property crimes.  The magnitudes of the estimated effects 
are sizable, with causal estimates probably being larger than the non-causal least squares 
estimates we study. The estimated social savings from crime reduction implied by our 
estimates are large, being of the order of £54 to £109 million. 
Other than Lochner and Moretti (2004) for the US and the results reported in this 
paper, evidence on the causal connection between education and crime is not available. The 
existence of a causal link leaves little doubt that the findings from this paper have important 
implications for longer term efforts aimed at reducing crime. For example, policies that 
subsidise schooling and human capital investment have significant potential to reduce crime 
in the longer run by increasing skill levels. Hence, improving education amongst offenders 
and potential offenders should be viewed as a key policy lever that could be used in the drive 
to combat crime. 
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Table 1: 
Imprisonment Rates (Percent), 2001 Census 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
All 
 
No Educational 
Qualifications 
 
Some Educational 
Qualifications 
 
  
 Imprison-
ment Rate 
Number 
of 
People 
Imprison-
ment Rate 
Number 
of 
People 
Imprison-
ment Rate 
Number 
of 
People 
Gap in 
Imprisonment 
Rate  Between 
No and Some 
Qualifications 
(Standard error) 
Relative 
Risk 
Ratio 
 
All 
 
0.13 
 
1183930 
 
0.23 
 
294871 
 
0.09 
 
804768 
 
0.14 (0.01) 
 
2.56 
 
 
Men 
 
0.25 
 
587992 
 
0.44 
 
142373 
 
0.17 
 
393447 
 
0.27 (0.02) 
 
2.59 
Men, 
Aged 
16-20 
0.34 62693 0.91 12048 0.18 45370 0.73 (0.06) 5.06 
Men, 
Aged 
21-25 
0.57 57441 2.57 6176 0.30 46713 2.27 (0.10) 8.57 
Men, 
Aged 
26-30 
0.42 61710 1.41 8036 0.27 50941 1.14 (0.08) 5.22 
Men, 
Aged 
31-64 
 
0.16 406148 0.22 116113 0.13 250423 0.09 (0.01) 1.69 
 
Women 
 
0.01 
 
595938 
 
0.03 
 
152498 
 
0.01 
 
411321 
 
0.02 (0.003) 
 
3.00 
Women, 
Aged 
16-20 
0.01 60397 0.05 9856 0.01 45078 0.04 (0.01) 5.00 
Women, 
Aged 
21-25 
0.04 57907 0.17 5229 0.02 48623 0.15 (0.03) 8.50 
Women, 
Aged 
26-30 
0.02 62415 0.07 7153 0.01 55262 0.06 (0.02) 7.00 
Women, 
Aged 
31-64 
 
0.01 392618 0.02 130260 0.01 262358 0.01 (0.003) 2.00 
 
Notes: Based on 16-64 year olds in the 3% Census microdata sample. 
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Table 2: 
Logit Estimates of Imprisonment Equations 
 
  
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
 
 
Marginal 
Effect 
X 100 
 
Relative 
Risk  
Ratio 
 
Sample  
Size 
 
All 
 
1.417 
(0.058) 
 
 
0.18 
 
 
4.12 
 
1099639 
 
Men 
 
1.412 
(0.060) 
 
0.35 
 
 
4.11 
 
535820 
 
Men,  
Aged 16-20 
2.210 
(0.152) 
0.74 
 
9.11 57418 
 
Men,  
Aged 21-25 
2.011 
(0.122) 
1.14 
 
7.47 52889 
 
Men,  
Aged 26-30 
1.301 
(0.144) 
0.54 
 
3.67 58977 
 
Men,  
Aged 31-64 
0.717 
(0.092) 
 
0.11 
 
2.05 366536 
 
 
Women 
 
1.498 
(0.254) 
 
0.02 
 
 
4.47 
 
563819 
 
Women,  
Aged 16-20 
2.697 
(0.754) 
0.04 
 
14.84 54934 
 
Women,  
Aged 21-25 
2.097 
(0.510) 
0.07 
 
8.14 53852 
 
Women,  
Aged 26-30 
0.878 
(0.699) 
0.02 
 
2.41 62415 
 
Women,  
Aged 31-64 
1.157 
(0.346) 
 
0.01 
 
3.18 392618 
 
 
Notes: As for Table 1. All specifications includes age dummies, 15 country of birth dummies, 
gender dummy (where applicable), non-white dummy, 5 marital status dummies, dummy for 
never worked, dummies for country. 
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Table 3:  
Ever Been Arrested or Ever Been in Court as the Accused (Percentages), 
2001-2007 British Crime Surveys 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
All 
 
No Educational 
Qualifications 
 
 
Some Educational 
Qualifications 
  
 
A. Arrested 
 
% Ever 
Been 
Arrested 
 
 
N 
 
% Ever 
Been 
Arrested 
 
N 
 
% Ever 
Been 
Arrested 
 
N 
 
Gap  
(Standard 
error) 
 
 
Relative 
Risk Ratio 
 
All 
 
12.9 
 
 
31349 
 
16.6 
 
7407 
 
11.8 
 
23942 
 
4.9 (0.5) 
 
1.41 
 
Men 
 
21.3 
 
14440 
 
29.8 
 
3016 
 
19.2 
 
11424 
 
10.6 (0.8) 
 
1.55 
Men, Aged 16-24 19.0   1847 30.8   251 17.2  1596 13.6(2.7) 1.79 
Men, Aged 25-64 
 
21.9 12593 29.6 2765 19.7  9828 9.9 (0.9) 1.50 
 
Women 
 
4.1 
 
16909 
 
5.9 
 
4391 
 
3.5 
 
12518 
 
2.3 (0.4) 
 
1.69 
Women, Aged 16-24 6.0   2173 11.6   364 5.0  1809 6.6 (1.4) 2.32 
Women, Aged 25-64 
 
3.7 14736 5.1 4027 3.1 10709 2.0 (0.3) 1.65 
 
B. In Court 
 
% Ever in 
Court as 
Accused 
 
 
N 
 
% Ever in 
Court as 
Accused 
 
 
N 
 
% Ever in 
Court as 
Accused 
 
 
N 
 
Gap  
(Standard 
error) 
 
Relative 
Risk Ratio 
 
All 
 
9.0 
 
47122 
 
11.9 
 
 
10837 
 
8.2 
 
36285 
 
3.7 (0.3) 
 
1.45 
 
Men 
 
15.2 
 
21687 
 
22.0 
 
4460 
 
13.5 
 
17227 
 
8.5 (0.6) 
 
1.63 
Men, Aged 16-25 9.6   2733 15.6   373 8.6  2360 7.0 (1.6) 1.81 
Men, Aged 26-64 
 
16.6 18954 23.0 4087 14.9 14867 8.1 (0.7) 1.54 
 
Women 
 
2.8 
 
25435 
 
3.7 
 
6377 
 
2.4 
 
19058 
 
1.3 (0.2) 
 
1.54 
Women, Aged 16-25 2.5 3272 4.7   532 2.1  2740 2.6 (0.7) 2.24 
Women, Aged 26-64 
 
2.8 22163 3.6 5845 2.5 16318 1.1 (0.2) 1.44 
 
Notes: Based on the pooled 2001/2-2007/8 British Crime Surveys. The precise questions 
asked are: 'Have you ever been arrested by the police for any reason?' and 'Have you ever 
been in court as the person ACCUSED of committing a crime?'. 
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Table 4: 
Logit Estimates of Ever Been Arrested/Ever Been in Court as the Accused Equations, 
2001-2007 British Crime Surveys 
 
  
Ever Been Arrested 
 
 
Ever Been in Court as 
the Accused 
 
   
All 0.688 (0.043) 
[6.6] 
RRR = 1.99 
 
0.581 (0.039) 
[4.1] 
RRR = 1.79 
 
Men 
 
0.666 (0.050) 
[12.3] 
RRR = 1.95 
 
0.624 (0.044) 
[9.3] 
RRR = 1.87 
 
Men, Aged 
16-24 
 
0.829 (0.157) 
[15.9] 
RRR = 2.29 
 
0.943 (0.154) 
[11.7] 
RRR = 2.57 
 
Men, Aged 
25-64 
 
0.644 (0.053) 
[11.8] 
RRR = 1.90 
 
 
0.595 (0.046) 
[9.1] 
RRR = 1.81 
 
Women 
 
0.730 (0.082) 
[2.8] 
RRR = 2.08 
 
0.444 (0.080) 
[1.3] 
RRR = 1.56 
 
Women, 
Aged 16-24 
 
 
0.964 (0.174) 
[9.4] 
RRR = 2.62 
 
0.864 (0.207) 
[3.2] 
RRR = 2.37 
 
Women, 
Aged 25-64 
 
0.665 (0.092) 
[2.2] 
RRR = 1.94 
 
 
0.377 (0.086) 
[1.1] 
RRR = 1.46 
 
Notes: Coefficients on No Qualifications dummy variable (standard error in round brackets, 
marginal effect X 100 in square brackets, RRR is relative risk ratio). All specifications 
include age dummies, gender dummy (where applicable), non-white dummy, 5 marital status 
dummies, dummy for in work, dummy for Wales, year dummies.  
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Table 5: 
Offending Rates and Education - Cohort Analysis 
 
  
A. Log(Property Crime Convictions Per 1000 Population),  
by Age and Year, 1984-2002 
 
 (1)  
Age 
Dummies 
(43) + Year 
Dummies 
(19) 
 
(2) 
(1) + LFS 
Controls, 
 
(3) 
(2) + NES 
Hourly Wage, 
 
(4) 
(2) + NES 
Hourly Wage, 
 
(5) 
(2) + NES 
Hourly Wage,  
 
(6) 
(2) + NES 
Hourly Wage, 
 
 All Men Women Men, 21-40 
Years of 
Education 
-0.053 
(0.055) 
-0.175 
(0.049) 
-0.162 
(0.049) 
-0.147 
(0.046) 
-0.342  
(0.169) 
-0.187 
(0.046) 
       
No 
Qualifications 
3.113 
(0.195) 
2.740 
(0.190) 
2.350 
(0.231) 
1.829 
(0.218) 
4.451  
(0.872) 
2.279 
(0.294) 
Sample 836 836 792 792 792 360 
  
B. Log(Violent Crime Convictions Per 1000 Population),  
by Age and Year, 1984-2002 
 
 (7)  
Age 
Dummies 
(43) + Year 
Dummies 
(19),  
 
(8) 
(7) + LFS 
Controls, 
 
(9) 
(8) + NES 
Hourly Wage, 
 
(10) 
(8) + NES 
Hourly Wage, 
 
(11) 
(8) + NES 
Hourly Wage,  
 
(12) 
(8) + NES 
Hourly Wage, 
 
 All Men Women Men, 21-40 
Years of 
Education 
0.036 
(0.059) 
0.031 
(0.060) 
0.035 
(0.064) 
0.005 
(0.062) 
-0.037 
 (0.347) 
-0.095 
(0.060) 
       
No 
Qualifications 
-0.311 
(0.238) 
-0.312 
(0.260) 
-0.601 
(0.339) 
-0.294 
(0.305) 
0.113 
 (1.811) 
-0.798 
(0.409) 
Sample 836 836 792 792 792 360 
 
Notes: Models estimated on age-year cells, including a full set of age and year dummy 
variables, for samples as described in Table between 1984 and 2002. Standard errors in 
parentheses. LFS control variables included are:  proportion male (in all sample), proportion 
employed, proportion non-white, and proportion living in London. 
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Table 6: 
Offending Rates and Education - Cohort Analysis, Causal Estimates 
 
  
Log(Property Crime Convictions Per 1000 Population), 
by Age and Year, 1984-2002 
 
 
Years of Education No Qualifications Versus Some Qualifications 
 (1) 
OLS - Crime 
(2) 
OLS - 1st 
Stage 
Education 
(3) 
2SLS - 
Crime 
(4) 
OLS - Crime 
(5) 
OLS - 1st 
Stage 
Education 
(6) 
2SLS - 
Crime 
A. All 
Years of 
Education 
-0.162 
(0.049)  
-0.511 
(0.084)    
No 
Qualifications    
2.350 
(0.231)  
2.117 
(0.496) 
SLA1  0.530 (0.030)   
-0.071 
(0.006)  
SLA2  0.640 (0.038)   
-0.104 
(0.008)  
F-test  
 
F(2, 724) = 
165.9 
[P = 0.000] 
  
F(2, 724) = 
92.5 
[P = 0.000] 
 
Sample Size 792 792 792 792 792 792 
       
B. Men 
Years of 
Education 
-0.147 
(0.046)  
-0.317 
(0.088)    
No 
Qualifications    
1.829 
(0.218)  
2.571 
(0.548) 
SLA1  0.553 (0.035)   
-0.087 
(0.007)  
SLA2  0.646 (0.043)   
-0.093 
(0.009)  
F-test  
 
F(2, 724) = 
130.5 
[P = 0.000] 
  
F(2, 724) = 
66.6 
[P = 0.000] 
 
Sample Size 792 792 792 792 792 792 
       
C. Men, 21-40 
Years of 
Education 
-0.187 
(0.046) 
 -1.166 
(0.372) 
   
No 
Qualifications 
   2.279 
(0.294) 
 4.147 
(0.848) 
SLA1  N/A   N/A  
SLA2  0.098 
(0.029) 
  -0.027 
(0.004) 
 
F-test   F(1, 318) = 
11.44 
[P = 0.008] 
  F(1, 318) = 
45.95 
[P = 0.000] 
 
Sample Size 360 360 360 360 360 360 
 
Notes: As for Table 5. All models include full sets of age and year dummies, plus LFS 
controls and NES wage.  SLA1 = 1 for those with compulsory school leaving age of 15 
(raised from 14 in 1947), = 0 otherwise; SLA2 = 1 for those whose with compulsory 
school leaving age of 16 (raised from 15 in 1973), = 0 otherwise. Men aged 21 to 40 are 
not affected (N/A) by SLA1 in the sample we have available. 
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Table 7: 
Offending Rates and Education - Cohort Analysis, 
Causal Estimates, Focusing on Particular Groups 
 
  
Log(Property Crime Convictions Per 1000 Population), by Age and Year 
 
 +/- 4 Birth Cohorts Around SLA2 All Sample 
  
Years of Education 
 
 
No Qualifications Versus 
Some Qualifications 
 
 
No Qualifications Versus 
Low Qualifications 
 (1) 
OLS - 
Crime 
(2) 
OLS - 1st 
Stage 
Education 
(3) 
2SLS – 
Crime 
(4) 
OLS - 
Crime 
(5) 
OLS - 1st 
Stage 
Education 
(6) 
2SLS - 
Crime 
(7) 
OLS - 
Crime 
(8) 
OLS - 1st 
Stage 
Education 
(9) 
2SLS - 
Crime 
A. All 
Years of 
Education 
-0.397 
(0.124)  
-0.653 
(0.162) 
      
No 
Qualifications    
1.732 
(0.691)  
3.902 
(1.009) 
1.237 
(0.135) 
 1.051 
(0.303) 
SLA1  N/A   N/A   -0.106 (0.010)  
SLA2  0.241 (0.025)  
 -0.040 
(0.005) 
  -0.162 (0.013)  
F-test  
 
F(1, 98)  
= 95.1 
[P = 
0.000] 
 
 F(1, 98)  
= 68.6 
[P = 
0.000] 
 
 
F(2, 724) 
= 76.8 
[P = 
0.000] 
 
Sample Size 144 144 144 144 144 144 792 792 792 
B. Men          
Years of 
Education 
-0.408 
(0.124) 
 -0.598 
(0.166) 
      
No 
Qualifications    
1.175 
(0.868)  
6.421 
(2.085) 
0.728 
(0.157) 
 0.952 
(0.449) 
SLA1  N/A   N/A   -0.067 (0.011)  
SLA2  0.245 (0.025) 
  -0.023 
(0.005) 
  -0.135 
(0.013) 
 
F-test  
 
F(1, 97)  
= 96.19 
[P = 
0.000] 
  F(1, 97)  
= 23.40 
[P = 
0.000] 
  F(2, 724) 
= 59.99 
[P = 
0.000] 
 
Sample Size 144 144 144 144 144 144 792 792 792 
          
C. Men, 21-40 
Years of 
Education 
-0.349 
(0.127) 
 -0.518 
(0.175) 
      
No 
Qualifications 
   1.121 
(0.801) 
 4.682 
(1.811) 
0.680 
(0.161) 
 1.543 
(0.329)  
SLA1  N/A   N/A   N/A  
SLA2  0.226 
(0.030) 
  -0.025 
(0.006) 
  -0.074 
0.007 
 
F-test   F(1, 76)  
= 55.6 
[P = 
0.000] 
  F(1, 76)  
= 18.0 
[P = 
0.000] 
  F(1, 318) 
= 102.05 
[P = 
0.000] 
 
Sample Size 116 116 116 116 116 116 360 360 360 
 
Notes: As for Table 6.  
 31
Table 8: 
Social Benefits from Decreasing Population with No Educational Qualification by 1 % 
 
 
 
No Qualifications 
Versus Some 
Qualifications 
 
 
No Qualifications 
Versus Low 
Qualifications 
2SLS Estimate of SLA Change of No Qualification  
Vs Reference Groups: 
Estimate  
2.117 
Estimate 
1.051 
   
Cost in Anticipation of Crime 153.1 153.1 
Cost as Consequence of Crime 723.4 723.4 
Cost to the Criminal Justice System  359 359 
Total Cost per Crime  1,235.5 1,235.5 
   
Number of Convictions 16,319 16,319 
Estimated Change in Convictions 345.5 117.5 
Estimated Change in Crimes 88,469 43,921 
   
Social Benefit from Crime Reduction £109,303,144 £54,264,338 
   
Cost per Student of One Year of Secondary School 4,000 4,000 
Number of Pupils in Education at 16 546,729 546,729 
Cost of 1% Increase or Extra Year of Education £21,869,160 £21,869,160 
   
Net Social Benefit from Crime Reduction £87,433,948 £32,395,178 
 
Notes: The cost of crime estimates are taken from Dubourg et al (2005).  
The estimated change in crime is adjusted by the number of crimes per 
conviction (i.e. 1/0.004 = 250). The cost of one year of secondary school 
per students is from Goodman and Sibieta (2006). 
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Appendix A - Census Establishments 
 
Table A1:  
Type of Communal Establishment, England, Wales and Scotland, Census 2001 
 
Value Label Percentage 
-9 Not Applicable 98.3 
1 NHS psychiatric hospital 0.0 
2 Other NHS hospital/home 0.1 
3 LA Children’s home 0.0 
4 LA Nursing home 0.0 
5 LA Residential care home 0.1 
6 LA Other home 0.0 
7 HA home or hostel 0.0 
8 Nursing homes (not HA/LA) 0.3 
9 Residential home (not HA/LA) 0.4 
10 Children’s home (not HA/LA) 0.0 
11 Psychiatric hospital (not HA/LA) 0.0 
12 Other hospital (not HA/LA) 0.0 
13 Other medical and care home (not HA/LA) 0.0 
14 Defence establishment (inc. ships) 0.1 
15 Prison service establishment 0.1 
16 Probation/bail hostel (not Scotland) 0.0 
17 Educational establishment 0.5 
18 Hotel/boarding house, guest home 0.1 
19 Hostel (inc. youth hostel, hostels for homeless and persons sleeping rough) 0.1 
20 Civilian ship, boat or barge 0.0 
21 Other 0.1 
 
Source: 2001 Individual CAMS Codebook, http://www.ccsr.ac.uk/sars 
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Appendix B - The Education Reforms 
 
Background on the Schooling Reforms 
The Education Act of 1944 laid the foundation for education in England and Wales as it is 
today (see Chan et al., 2002). The Act recognised the importance of education for economic 
advancement and social welfare. In terms of secondary education, its aim was to provide 
compulsory secondary education for all children so that every child had equal opportunity to 
obtain a place in a grammar school, regardless of family background. Most Local Education 
Authorities (LEA) interpreted the 1944 Act to mean the provision of schooling according to 
ability. The Act introduced a tripartite system into secondary schools, by using an ‘objective’ 
examination to test pupils’ intelligence and abilities in English and arithmetic.  This approach 
identified three groups of children: (i) Academic pupils, who went to the secondary grammar 
schools. These schools provided the main route to university; (ii) Practical pupils, who went 
to the technical schools that were vocationally based. There were very few technical schools 
because the cost of running them was high; and (iii) Remaining pupils, mostly working class, 
went to the secondary modern school where they received a more basic education.  
The Education Act of 1944 also resulted in the two raisings of the minimum school-
leaving age from 14 to 15 in 1947 and from 15 to 16 in 1973. The policy makers’ motivation 
for increasing the school-leaving age was to “improve the future efficiency of the labour 
force, increase physical and mental adaptability, and prevent the mental and physical 
cramping caused by exposing children to monotonous occupations at an especially 
impressionable age” (Oreopoulos, 2006). Harmon and Walker (1995) show that the 1947 
change was particularly influential in raising participation in post-compulsory education. 
That is, many of those who would otherwise have left at the old minimum stayed on beyond 
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new minimum. Oreopoulos (2006) also shows that within two years of the 1947 policy 
change, the portion of 14-year-olds who left school fell from 57 to less than 10 percent. 
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